What Goes Around Comes Around

The “Cycle of Juvenile Justice” was first articulated by Thomas Bernard in 1992 and refers to a repetitive historical pattern of juvenile justice incidents and policy responses in the United States. Beginning in the early 1800s, juvenile justice policies alternated between harsh punishment and lenient treatment for juvenile offenders (Bernard & Kurlychek, 2010).

The cycle, according to Bernard, is at all points driven by factors that are described as historical constants: 1) the widespread belief that juvenile crime is at an all‐time high and getting worse; 2) the belief that the juvenile justice system itself is responsible for the high levels of juvenile crime, hence reform of the system will effectively address the problem. Because of these historical constants, it is inevitable that any reform successfully enacted will, in its turn, become perceived as the source of the problem and be scrapped (Bernard & Kurlychek, 2010). .

The cycle begins when the public as well as justice officials arrive at an awareness (belief) that juvenile crime is high and that there are many harsh punishments, but few lenient treatments for offenders. Justice officials are put in a position of making decisions, alternating between harsh, lenient, and sometimes doing nothing at all. This “forced” choice is backed up by a public that believes that variously believes harsh punishments increase juvenile crime and doing nothing increases juvenile crime. What is the solution? Introduce lenient treatments. Everyone feels good that things will get better; that crime rates will decline
(Bernard & Kurlychek, 2010).

But then both the public and justice officials remain convinced that juvenile crime is too high. Now, they blame the lenient treatments, and the pendulum swings in the opposite direction; they believe the only way to fix it is to take a “get tough” approach through the favoring of harsh punishments. Justice officials are again forced to choose between harsh and lenient responses. And so the process continues with the cycle returning to where it started (Bernard & Kurlychek, 2010).

To break it down more simply, there are three major components to the cycle:

1. belief that juvenile crime is exceptionally high
2. belief that present policies make it worse
3. belief that changing policies will reduce juvenile crime

At every step in the process, people believe that their ideas are truly new and will make a difference. This belief cycle, which has existed for the better part of 200 years, drives the system (Bernard & Kurlychek, 2010).

Two other perceptions are also bound up in this system and are revealed to change over time: the idea of juvenile justice and the idea of juvenile delinquency. Note that the two concepts are linked. How you view/understand who is a juvenile exerts a big impact on what you think is the appropriate response by the justice system. For example, do you favor “punishment and deterrence” responses or do you favor reform and rehabilitation approaches? (Bernard & Kurlychek, 2010).

The First Rule of Criminal Justice Thermodynamics

Letting youth off scot-free results in public pressure to reform the juvenile justice system and the cycle repeats (Bernard & Kurlychek, 2010).

Where Are We Now?

We are currently in a phase that attempting to replace more than a decade of “get tough” policies with more lenient ones. Current policies emphasize behavior modification, counseling, and therapy (Bernard & Kurlychek, 2010).

How Do We Break the Cycle?

Bernard proposes that we study history and that we make an effort to see ourselves as well as our beliefs and policies within a historical context. By looking at the problem from a distance, so to speak, the cycle becomes easier to see and break.

The cycle can only be broken when we realize that there are no “magic bullet” policies that can break the cycle. In other words, we must change our belief that there is some, as of yet, undiscovered policy can influence juvenile crime rates. This is because juvenile crime will always reflect what is happening in the society at large. As such, the ills of any given historical moment will be reflected in the incidents and nature of juvenile crime. To truly change crime you have to reject behaviorist (individualist) approaches and change the root causes that exist in our society – not just the juvenile justice system (Bernard & Kurlychek, 2010).

Theories on Juvenile Delinquency

No single theoretical orientation can adequately explain the multiple variables and factors that cause delinquent behavior, so criminologists have taken the best parts of different social theories and combined them to explain crime and delinquency.

Before we get into some of the particulars, it might be easy to think of three general theories on juvenile delinquency. The three theories are the anomie theory, the subculture theory, and the differential opportunity theory.

Anomie Theory

Anomie theory was first developed by Robert Merton in the 1940’s. Merton’s theory explains that juvenile delinquency occurs because the juveniles do not have the means to make themselves happy. Given their limited perspective, they often find that their goals are unattainable and so they often resort to unlawful means by which to attain their goals. To illustrate, a juvenile who doesn’t have money wants to get a job and purchase car to get to work…but they don’t have money. As a result, they might decide to steal a car or steal money to purchase a car.

Subculture Theory

In 1955, Albert Cohen developed the subculture theory, which is actually an amalgamation of several of his theories. Subculture theory posits that juveniles who do not “fit” and/or meet conventional social standards may seek validation from a subculture. The subculture group is formed of other juveniles who also do not meet conventional social standards. These groups then engage in behavior that is generally viewed not socially acceptable; and so, they actively rebel against socially acceptable standards.

Put another way, Cohen understands juvenile delinquency to be a product of society. Given this, when juveniles commit crimes, such as stealing, they do so because they are violating a social norm, and in doing so they signal conformity with their subculture.

Differential Opportunity Theory

Differential opportunity theory, developed by Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin in 1960, believes that opportunity plays a role in juvenile delinquency. Cloward and Ohlin believe that if juveniles were presented with more opportunities to succeed, they would be less likely to turn to affiliation with subculture groups for validation.

Additionally, differential opportunity theory holds that there may be other circumstances besides social factors that contribute to a juvenile’s delinquency. For example, the theory posits that the juvenile may be successful during school but may fail to find gainful employment. The inability to find gainful employment can lead the juvenile to be delinquent (not simply social factors).

The differential opportunity theory differs from the subculture theory because there are reasons other than social factors that can lead a juvenile to be delinquent. If the juvenile has more opportunities, they will be more willing to succeed than to join a subculture.

Additional Theories

Rational Choice Theory

Classical theory, also called Rational or Choice Theory, is based on the early writings of Cesare Beccaria (1738–1794) and Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832). This explanation assumes that crime results from a rational process in which offenders make decisions and choices, often planning their criminal activity so as to maximize the benefits and avoid the risks (see Cornish & Clarke, 1986, pp. 1–2).

According to classical theory, crime and delinquency are attributed to free will & voluntary choice. People commit a crime and engage in delinquency for the simple reason that they made an individual rational decision to do so.  In light of this, it was assumed that because crime was a rational choice, offenders could be deterred by punishment.

Explanations of crime as a rational choice, while supported in some cases, is also disputed by scholars and researchers. In the latter instance, there is concern that the theory does not explain criminal behavior as much as it helps support a legal system that endeavors to justify punishments to “fit” crimes.

Interestingly enough, even though rational choice explanations do not always enjoy support across the board, they remain popular with the public. Likewise, they are widely supported by law enforcement, lawmakers, and even some academic disciplines, like economics, political science, and law (see, e.g., Cornish & Clarke, 1986; Akers, 1990).

Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson (1979) developed a version of rational choice theory called routine activity theory to help explain trends and cycles in the crime rate since the 1960s. They concluded that crime is related to the interaction of three variables associated with the “routine activities” of everyday life: the availability of suitable targets of crime; the absence of capable guardians; and the presence of motivated offenders.  So for example, when looking at the crime of theft, it is assumed that when more homes are unoccupied due to more persons employed (and fewer neighbors, family members, or relatives looking after them), they are more likely to be targeted by unemployed teens or young adults.

The routine activity approach links delinquency to social conditions that increase opportunities for crime; likewise, they emphasize the role that the victim’s lifestyle and behavior play in the crime process. Felson (1994) described how growth and social changes in cities, neighborhoods, and schools have increased the likelihood of crime occurring.

There is evidence that supports the idea that a lot of juvenile crime reflects rational choices are being made, as crime has a tendency to occur when youth perceive that their chances of being caught are low; even if they are caught, many are aware that the punishment for juvenile crime is often much less than for comparable crimes committed by adults.

Critics of RC Theory

Critics of Rational Choice theory question the degree to which criminal behavior is always a rational, free will process. Ronald Akers (1990) questioned whether offenders really make rational decisions to commit a crime based on knowledge of the law and possible punishments. His research tried to establish whether or not decisions to engage in crime and delinquency were made in the absence of other situational factors that may have influenced them being committed.

Rational choice proponents, I should point out, do not always hold to a strict definition of rationality. Rather, they acknowledge that situational factors do affect individuals’ choices. Given this, efforts have been made to integrate rational choice theory with other theoretical explanations (see, e.g., Felson, 1986; Hirschi, 1986).

Doubtless, there are many crimes that reflect the rational choices of persons. This may especially hold true in cases of white-collar crime, which are committed by persons in the workplace and pose relatively little risk of detection, conviction, or punishment.

Strain Theories

Strain theories of delinquency explain the delinquency of youths as a response to a lack of socially approved opportunities. Simply put, it is a theory that explains delinquency as caused by the “strain” or frustration of not having an equal opportunity or means to achieve commonly idealized goals such as economic or social success. In this manner, we might also think of strain theories as structural theories, given how opportunities are not always evenly distributed and available to everyone, based on how they are situated within social structure.

Strain theorists regard juvenile antisocial behavior as caused by the frustrations of lower class youth when they find themselves unable to achieve the material success expected of the middle class.

Robert Merton (1957) was an eminent social theorist who elaborated  strain theory from Emile Durkheim’s concept of “anomie” or “normlessness.” Merton applied Durkheim’s anomie theory as a means to explain how crime might result from the rapidly changing conditions in society; especially in societies where competition for success, wealth, and material goods are highly valued. Social disorganization leads to uncertainty, confusion, and shifting moral values, referred to as anomie or normlessness. Conditions of anomie exist when the rule of law is weakened and becomes powerless to maintain social control.

Given these social conditions, a conflict may result when persons with little formal education and access to economic resources are denied in their efforts to achieve the common goals esteemed in American society. This causes an individual-level conflict and may, furthermore, produce a sense of alienation, hopelessness, and frustration.

Merton claimed this experience of frustration may incentivize persons to engage in alternative/delinquent/criminal means in order that they may attain their socially desired goals.

Strain Theory emphasizes that most people share similar values, goals, and aspirations; but many people do not have equal ability or means to achieve goals, such as economic or social success. The discrepancy between what persons want and their limited opportunities to achieve them produces frustration, or “strain.”

Thus, under conditions of anomie, crime may be considered a “normal” response to the strain of existing social conditions.

Because opportunities for success are more open for the middle and upper classes, strain is experienced most by those in the lower socioeconomic classes, where quality education and employment opportunities are more limited. The strain and frustration resulting from blocked opportunities increase the likelihood that some individuals will use deviant and illegitimate means to achieve their goals.

Strain theory explains why many lower-class youth resort to theft, drug dealing, and other delinquent behavior when they perceive fewer legitimate means and opportunities to achieve their goals. Strain and social disorganization are similar because they emphasize the relationship between social variables such as poverty, economic opportunity, and available goods and services to crime and delinquency. Strain is more common among lower-class poor people, who live in rural as well as inner-city urban areas characterized by increased social problems and crime. Strain theory has been expanded and further developed by other criminologists. The

These opportunity–structure theories (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) were instrumental to promoting government-funded policies such as “Head Start,” pre-K education, and jobs programs for lower-class youths as a way to enhance educational and employment opportunities and reduce crime and delinquency.

Robert Agnew (1992) extended Merton’s theory of strain and anomie to better explain varieties of delinquent behavior through the general strain theory. Agnew identified three sources of strain:

1. 1. Strain caused by the failure to achieve positively valued goals, basically the same as Merton’s theory of anomie.
   2. Strain caused by the removal of positively valued stimuli from the individual. Examples include the loss of a girl/boy friend, death of a loved one, divorce or separation of parents, or leaving friends and moving to a new neighborhood or school.
   3. Strain as the presentation of negative stimuli, such as child abuse and neglect, physical punishment, family and peer conflict, stressful life conditions, school failure, and criminal victimization (see Agnew, 1992, p. 57).

Agnew’s general strain theory in this regard has made an important contribution to explaining delinquency. Likewise, there is evidence that youth who report being “hassled” by peers, who have bad peer relationships, or experience victimization or similar “negative life events” are also more likely to engage in delinquency (Agnew & White, 1992).

Additional research supports this which finds that strains such as a family breakup, unemployment, moving, feelings of dissatisfaction with friends and school are positively related to delinquency (Paternoster & Mazerolle, 1994).

Simply put, strain theory helps to explain how stressful incidents and sources of strain in the life course influence patterns of offending.

Sociological Theories

Social structure theories

These theories claim that forces such as social disorganization, status frustration, and cultural deviance lead lower-class youths to become involved in delinquent behavior.

Social reaction theories

These theories focus more on how society, social institutions, and government officials react to crime and delinquency than on why offenders commit crime.

Social process (control) theories

Social process explanations of delinquency focus not on societal structures but on social interactions between individuals and environmental influences that may lead to delinquent behavior. These theories argue that all individuals have the potential and opportunity to perpetrate delinquent or criminal offenses, but most refrain from such behavior because of fear and social constraints.

Among social-control theories are social disorganization theory, which relates to the inability of social institutions and communities to adequately socialize and control its youth; social-bonding theory, which holds that a youth’s behavior is significantly related to a social bond that ties a youth to the social order; and containment theory, which focuses on the quality and number of inner and outer containment mechanisms for controlling juveniles’ behavior.

According to control theory, delinquency is more likely among youth who lack social bonds and positive social interactions among parents and peers.

Social process (learning) theories

These theories generally emphasize explanations that explain delinquency on the basis of social interactions between individuals and social group influences that lead to delinquency.

Differential association theory was developed by Edwin Sutherland, who believed that delinquency is learned behavior as youths interact with each other. The theory is founded on a number of propositions (Sutherland & Cressey, 1970, pp. 75–77). Differential association theory holds that delinquency is a learned behavior as youth interact closely with other deviant youth:

1. 1. Criminal behavior is learned.
   2. Criminal behavior is a process of communication, learned in interaction with other persons.
   3. The principal part of the learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate personal groups.
   4. When criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes (a) techniques of committing the crime; and (b) the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes.
   5. The specific direction of the motives and drives is learned from definitions of the legal codes as favorable or unfavorable.
   6. A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of law over definitions unfavorable to violation of law – this is the principle of differential association. 
   7. Differential association may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and intensity.
   8. The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and anti-criminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in any other type of learning.
   9. While criminal behavior is an expression of general needs and values, it is not explained by those general needs and values since noncriminal behavior is an expression of the same needs and values.              

      Sutherland’s differential association theory stimulated considerable research on explaining delinquent behavior; it remains an important explanation for juvenile delinquency, as it is difficult to dispute the idea that crime is learned like other behaviors.

      This explanation also has a positive appeal as it holds that youth are changeable and can be taught prosocial behavior. Delinquency prevention efforts have proven to be most effective when they are directed at reducing the criminal influence among groups of antisocial youths.

      Burgess and Akers (1966) reformulated differential association theory according to operant conditioning principles; Akers (1985) further developed an explanation of deviant behavior according to a social learning approach.                                                                                

Developmental or life-course theories

explanations attempt to account for differences between offenders who begin offending at an early age and continue offending, and those who begin in adolescence and grow out of it.

Intersectional theories take into account different interpenetrating social dynamics, such as those that involve race, class, and gender.

Ultimately, for juvenile justice researchers and practitioners, the best theory is one that recommends policies, programs, and strategies for effective crime reduction and delinquency prevention.

Discussion Questions

What might Social Learning theories tell us about what happens when juveniles exposed to different social problems (drugs, violence, poverty) are put into a containment facility together?

How might we use Routine Activity Theory to explain a convenience store robbery (remember the 3 variables – available target, the absence of surveillance, and a motivated perpetrator)?

Think of similar situations that you were in, where you decided to commit a crime or not (small or otherwise) for example, maybe you decided to steal something. Why or why not? What made the difference in your decision? What was missing from the three requirements for crime as a “routine activity”?

How might the fact that we live in a violent society that is perpetually at war contribute to the decision-making of youth, who make choices to engage in criminality, delinquency, and violence?

What is Juvenile Delinquency?

Juvenile delinquency and crime is a problem in the United States. Research has established that a sizeable majority of young people admit to engaging in some types of delinquent behavior. Although only a small number are ever apprehended by police officers, even fewer are ever referred to a juvenile court.

Definitions of juvenile delinquency vary according to statutory definitions in each state. Most states define a “juvenile” for jurisdictional purposes as a person between the ages of 10 to 18 years of age; although in some states 16-and 17-year-olds may be treated as adults when they have committed a crime.

A “delinquent child” is defined generally as a child who has violated any state or local law; a federal law or law of another state; or who has escaped from confinement in a local or state correctional facility.

What Kind of Crimes Do Youth Commit?

The majority of crimes committed by juveniles are offenses such as theft and shoplifting, vandalism, drug and alcohol use, disorderly conduct, and simple assaults – hitting, kicking, and fights that do not result in serious injury.

Youths engage in behavior such as curfew violations, running away, disobeying parents, school truancy, and alcohol violations. These are referred to as status offenses because they apply only to juvenile-age youth and children, and are not punishable under a state penal code.

Paradoxically, statistics indicate that juvenile arrests have been on the
decline for more than a decade in the United States. Nevertheless, some troubling patterns persist and these vary greatly by geographic location, offense, and demographic group.

Why Do We Care About Juvenile Crime if it’s Not Serious?

Most serious property and personal violent crimes are committed by adult offenders over the age of 18. Considerable attention is directed at delinquent behavior and juvenile offending, however, for at least two reasons:.

1) Juvenile-age youth commit a disproportionate number of crimes (compared with their proportion of the population)

2) Delinquency prevention efforts are the first step in reducing crime and violence committed by adult offenders.

Given these findings, which are documented in scientific studies, criminologists, social scientists, lawmakers, and policymakers have focused their efforts on examining the causes of juvenile crime, and on developing programs and public policies to prevent delinquency and correct juvenile offenders.

What is Juvenile Justice?

Juvenile justice is the area of criminal law applicable to persons not old enough to be held responsible for criminal acts. In most states, the age for criminal culpability is currently set at 18 years (again, in some states 16-and 17-year-olds may be treated as adults when they have committed a crime).

Juvenile law is mainly governed by state law and most states have enacted a juvenile code.

The parens patriae doctrine was the legal basis for court jurisdiction over juveniles and was central to the juvenile court philosophy because children who violated laws were not to be treated as criminals. Children were considered less mature and less aware of the consequences of their actions, so they were not to be held legally accountable for their behavior in the same manner as adults. Under the juvenile justice philosophy, youthful offenders were designated as delinquent rather than as criminal and the primary purpose of the juvenile justice system was not punishment but rehabilitation (see Mennel, 1972, and Davis, 1980).

History of Juvenile Justice

The American juvenile justice system has developed over the past century with a number of differences that distinguish it from the adult criminal justice process. Juvenile justice advocates supported the differences on diminished youthful offender accountability and legal understanding and youths’ greater amenability to treatment.

The first juvenile court was established in Chicago, Illinois, in 1899. There is still debate a century later over the goals and the legal procedures for dealing with juvenile offenders. The question of whether juvenile offenders should be tried and sentenced differently than adult offenders elicits strongly held opinions from citizens, policymakers, and professionals.

Transfer provisions – the practice of waiving juveniles offenders from the juvenile system to the adult system – are on the uptick, though they remain controversial for reasons that the research shows that the outcomes are less than satisfactory.

Originally, the juvenile justice system was established on the principle of individualized justice and focused on rehabilitation of youthful offenders. While due process protections were considered important, they were considered secondary in importance given the court’s emphasis on care, treatment, and rehabilitation for juveniles. It was believed that youths could be held responsible for their unlawful behavior and society could be protected through an informal justice system that focused on treatment and “the best interests of the child.” This approach is still appropriate and effective for the majority of juvenile offenders, whose crimes range from status offenses to property offenses to drug offenses.

Reform; Not Punishment

The juvenile courts sought to turn juvenile delinquents into productive citizens by focusing on treatment rather than punishment. The laws that established the juvenile courts clearly distinguished their purpose as different from the adult penal codes.

A ruling by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case of Commonwealth v. Fisher in 1905 supported the juvenile court’s purpose, and illustrates how the court’s role in training delinquent children superseded the rights of children and their parents:

The design is not punishment, nor the restraint imprisonment, any more than is the wholesome restraint which a parent exercises over his child. . . . Every statute which is designed to give protection, care, and training to children, as a parental duty, is but a recognition of the duty of the state, as the legitimate guardian and protector of children where other guardianship fails. No constitutional right is violated. [Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48 (1905)]

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thus supported the juvenile court’s treatment objectives over the rights of the juvenile or the parents.

Because the purpose of the juvenile court was for the protection and treatment of the child and not for punishment, the juvenile proceeding was more civil than criminal and also informal (unlike the more formal, adversarial criminal court process).

Juvenile reform efforts were also based on the growing optimism that application of the social sciences was more appropriate for handling juvenile offenders than the law.

Delinquency was viewed more as a social problem and a breakdown of the family than a criminal problem.

Sources

Mennel, R.M.(1972). ‘Origins of the Juvenile Court: Changing Perspectives on the Legal Rights of Juvenile Delinquents,’ in Crime and Delinquency 18: 68-78.

Discussion Questions

Why do you think youth become involved in delinquent activity?

What kinds of delinquent activity did you observe among peers growing up? Did you become involved at any point with this activity? If not, how were you able to stay out of trouble? Who do you credit as having a favorable influence in your life to help you avoid being labeled a “troubled youth.”

What do you think about “zero-tolerance” policies for youth offenders?

Delinquency & Victimization

Children and youth are victims of theft and violent crimes. Some juveniles are victims of abuse and neglect at the hands of their parents or other caregivers. The term “dependent and neglected children” describes those who are not provided with proper shelter, clothing, food, clean and safe living conditions, and medical needs. Child abuse ranges from verbal abuse to physical and sexual abuse.

The term “dependent and neglected children” describes those who are not provided with proper shelter, clothing, food, clean and safe living conditions, and medical needs. Child abuse ranges from verbal abuse to physical and sexual abuse.

Data Sources

The extent of child victimization is reported by the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (NCANDS) (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2007). Child victimization has been linked to problem behaviors, delinquency, and criminal behavior later in life. An understanding of victimization and juvenile delinquency is, therefore, important for a better understanding of the most appropriate juvenile justice system responses to these problems.

Highlights from the Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National Report (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006) indicate the seriousness and extent of juvenile victimization in the United States:

• • On average, between 1980 and 2002 about 2,000 juveniles were murdered annually in the United States.

• • In 2002, on average, four juveniles were murdered daily in the United States.

• • Children under 6 years of age who were victims of murder were most often killed by a parent.

• • Nearly one million (906,000) children were victims of abuse or neglect in 2003, a rate of 12 victims per 1,000 children ages 0–17.

• • As juveniles age, they are less likely to be victims of a violent crime by a family member.

• • About two-thirds of violent crimes with juvenile victims occur in a residence.

• • Youth between ages 7 and 17 are about as likely to be victims of suicide as they are to be victims of homicide.
  • About half of all violent crimes experienced by male and female students occurred in school or on the way to and from school.

• • Many youths are subjected to inappropriate and potentially dangerous experiences on the Internet.

The extensive national television and news media reporting of school shooting incidents presented the false impression that most schools are unsafe and violent places and that children and youth are more at risk of victimization in schools than elsewhere (Lawrence & Mueller, 2003). In fact, only a small percentage of violent victimization and homicides involving juvenile victims occur in schools. Children and youth are at greater risk of victimization in their own homes and in other parts of their communities. Understanding the true extent and source of juvenile crime and victimization is the first step to responding effectively to the problem.

Homicide tends to receive the most attention in government and news media reports of deaths of children and youth. Deaths by homicide, however, are not the most common causes of deaths of children and young people. According to the Centers for Disease Control, the leading cause of death for children and youth is accidents and unintentional injury; homicide ranks fourth for children ages 5–9, fifth for youth ages 10–14, and second for youth and young adults ages 15–19. More youth aged 10–14 were victims of suicide (244) than homicide (202) in the United States in 2003 (Heron & Smith, 2007).

The rank and frequency of leading causes of death for young people is often studied by researchers, who note, for example, that one reason homicide ranks higher as a cause of death among children and youth is because they are less likely to die of “natural” health-related deaths than older people.

Research reports confirm that suicide is also a leading cause of death of young people. Snyder and Sickmund (2006) reported that between 1990 and 2001, suicide was more prevalent than homicide among white juveniles (p. 25). The statistical reports from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2008b) note that while homicide is one of the leading causes of death among children and youth, many deaths can be prevented through better education and supervision to prevent accidental deaths and through more comprehensive provisioning of mental health services for young people. Law enforcement and juvenile justice officials are focusing efforts on reducing the number of homicides and nonfatal victimization of juveniles.

Juvenile Crime Trends – Going Up or Down?

Juvenile offending is often perceived to be extensive and serious, despite the fact that most serious property and violent crimes are committed by offenders over 18 years of age.

Violent crimes committed by juveniles less than 18 years of age have been trending down, though they are increasing in some places in recent years. Not surprisingly, violent crimes are reported more often and they generate a disproportionate amount of news coverage, so the public often gets a distorted view of the true extent of juvenile crime.

What Does the Research Say?

In what some have termed to be “high-profile” crimes (Chancer, 2010) a growing number of juveniles are involved in school violence, gang-related violence, and assaults with weapons resulting in fatalities and serious injuries.

A 2013 Vera Institute study notes that of 10,400 cases, 36 percent of status offenses were for skipping school, 22 percent involved liquor violations, 11 percent were related to running away from home, and 10 percent involved curfew violations. These kinds of offenses are essentially “mistakes” that can be handled in ways that do not involve institutionalization with sentences in juvenile facilities.

Intervention programs like those implemented in Ohio and Texas are a more effective and less costly means to rehabilitate or reform juvenile offenders.

Sources

National Report, Juvenile Offenders and Victims, 2014.

Questions

What are the leading causes of death for children and young people (according to the National Report, Juvenile Offenders and Victims….also check the CDC)? 

What kinds of changes to the different social policies (i.e. welfare, minimum wage, education, drug policy) do you think might help ease some of the family stress and suffering disadvantaged youth endure? (for in spite of their problems and sometimes poor decisions, they are likely to have endured more than their fair share of hardship growing up)  

How might we use an “intersectional” framework to call attention to social problems associated with gun violence ( a framework that takes into account interpenetrating social factors like race, social class, and gender)?

What role might patriarchal social relations play in fostering the conditions for youth violence as well as victimization? 

How might social media exacerbate or help with the problem of youth violence?

Have you ever witnessed a crime on social media?

The Problem

Youth violence encompasses a range of experiences and behaviors. Gang activity, bullying, sexual assault, physical violence, family violence, gendered violence, and gun violence are all examples of the different kinds of violence to which youth may risk exposure.

When it comes to guns, the climate in the United States is unlike that of any other developed nation in the world. Here we find that a combination of widespread gun ownership in addition to weak gun safety laws (and a political climate that makes it impossible to even discuss the issue) all combines to create a uniquely dangerous environment for American children. Globally, 91% of children killed with guns in high-income countries are killed in the US. Every year, over 8,000 minors are killed or seriously injured by firearms in the US. 

Are School Shootings a Public Health Crisis?

The idea that we might treat the topic of school shootings  and gun violence in general as a public health crisis is not so far-fetched when we consider how gun-related violence shares many striking similarities to public health epidemics such as cholera in Haiti or HIV/AIDS in the United States.

In this instance, there are discernible social patterns of transmission in the United States that go beyond aggregate factors such as race, age, gender, and income. On an individual level, social networks — the people the individuals hang out with — may predict a given person’s likelihood of being shot and killed (i.e. social learning theories, routine activities theory).

Since Columbine, more than 221,000 K-12 students  have experienced a shooting at their school. Most American schoolchildren today have been alive for at least six of the 10 deadliest mass shootings in American history, including the December 2012 mass murder at Sandy Hook Elementary that resulted in the death of 20 first-graders and six adults. Unsurprisingly, a majority of high school students report feeling concerned about a mass shooting in their own school or community (Giffords, 2019). For more on this see statistics and charts published by Giffords.org.

Guns are the leading cause of death for children under 18 in the United States.

In a study published in March 2017 in the American Journal of Public Health, Andrew V. Papachristos and Christopher Wildeman applied the science of social networks to study patterns of gun homicide in Chicago. The idea here was fairly simple: treat gun homicide like a blood-borne pathogen; something transmitted from person to person through specific risky behaviors.

Unfortunately, gun violence is not simply an airborne pathogen: You don’t catch a bullet like you catch a cold (Papachristos and Wildeman, 2017). Nevertheless, there is much that we might learn from this research and its approach to the study of gun violence.

Noteworthy is how the researchers found, using research methods of social network analysis, that more than 40 percent of all gun homicides in their study occurred within a network of 3,100 people, roughly 4 percent of the community’s population.

Put another way, the mere fact of being among the 4 percent of a defined social network increased a person’s odds of being killed by a gun by 900 percent!

These numbers demonstrate how gun violence can spread like HIV infection: You’re more likely to “catch” the disease if you engage in risky behaviors with someone who might be infected. And it’s not just people’s friends who affect their likelihood of getting shot, but also their friends’ friends. This is similar to the transmission of HIV: Your current partner’s past sexual partners affect your exposure, even if you don’t know them.

In the case of gun homicide, seemingly random victims end up “in the wrong place at the wrong time” by indirect exposure, such as getting a ride from a friend’s cousin or by going to the party of a friend’s friend. In these cases, gun victimization is tragic but not random.

Understanding the socially networked nature of gun violence has important implications for how it can be addressed. Prevention efforts can be directed toward those individuals and communities most susceptible to the infection.

The solution is not broad sweeping public policies and policing practices, such as New York’s “stop and frisk” (which justified the targeting of blacks and Latinos on the basis of hunting for weapons) or even mass arrests.

A more data-driven, effective way to solve the problem involves taking the opposite approach: employing highly targeted efforts to reach specific people in specific places, akin to providing clean needles to drug users to prevent the spread of HIV.

By studying gun violence like we study disease, it is possible that we might improve our chances of predicting which people are most at risk of having a gun and/or being shot.

This is an example of how using data to inform policing practice (a scalpel and not a shotgun blast approach) can help officials to respond better, smarter, and more fairly.

Youth, Firearms & School Shootings: What Are the Odds?

Researchers, not to mention the public, are all interested in knowing if it is possible to predict who is more likely to pull the trigger and/or die at the hands of a gun. To answer this, we begin to get a sense of some of the patterns that distinguish shootings in cases like Sandy Hook Elementary School,  Virgina Tech, and Columbine High School, all of which shared young shooters and young victims in common.

Why Is It Always a White Guy?

While the high-profile mass shootings all share youth in common, as sociologist Michael Kimmel points out, they all share race and gender in common too. The paradox that researchers seek to unwind looks like this:

1. the vast majority of white men do not engage in high-profile/mass & school shootings;
2. yet the vast majority of these types of shooters are white men. [for more on this, check out Kimmel’s book “Angry White Men,” 2017].
   

This is why researchers will often advocate for an intersectional theoretical approach to study gun crime and its victims. They look at how, for example, race, class, and gender are deeply intertwined and produce different outcomes in different social contexts.

Careful, “You’ll Shoot Your Eye Out Kid” 

This is the famous admonition offered by Santa Claus to Ralphie in the holiday favorite movie “A Christmas Story.” As it turns out, Ralphie was not alone in burning desire to obtain and use a firearm. Consequently, the United States, tragically, is the undisputed leader when it comes to violent toddlers.

In 2015, toddlers were responsible for more shootings and shooting deaths, than terrorists. Since the beginning of 2015, there were 52 toddler involved shooting incidents in the US. According to the Washington Post:

“In 2015 so far, at least 13 toddlers have inadvertently killed themselves with firearms, 18 more injured themselves, 10 injured other people, and two killed other people.”

When that article was published in Oct 2015,  there had only been 43 toddler shooting incidents. Since then, toddler shootings have continued, with an average of one toddler involved shooting a week. These stats are just for toddlers though and could very well be inaccurate (as in, there might be more), as incidents involving children and guns often don’t get reported.

Children shot accidentally — usually by other children — are collateral casualties of the easy accessibility of guns in America. Their deaths all the more devastating because they were preventable. Adults, who claim to be “law abiding gun owners,” who know how to secure their weapons,” are only law abiding until they’re not. The results speak for themselves.

The United States has the most deadly toddlers in the world

Unintentional shootings are just one of the many ways that guns kill, injure, and traumatize thousands of American children every year. Firearm suicide, domestic violence, community violence, and mass shootings pose a significantly higher risk to kids in the United States than kids in other high-income countries.

As was demonstrated in the film “Bulletproof,” some children live in neighborhoods where shootings are a daily occurrence. They live in fear of being hit by stray bullets as they walk home from school or sit on their front porches. At home, they are taught to hide under beds or in bathtubs at the sound of gunfire. At school, they learn how to barricade doors and run.

The combined impact of this means that many children can never feel safe – not ever! When children are robbed of any sense of safety and security, this can have a lasting detrimental impact on their lives and wellbeing. Many children exposed to shootings who live in these environments (estimates 40-50%) will develop PTSD.

Policy Proposals – How Can We Fix the Problem?

Former President Obama, in the aftermath of the Newtown, Conn. shooting that claimed 20 innocent little victims, signed an executive order requiring more research on gun violence by the CDC and other federal agencies. Despite this, there has been very little follow-through. Implementation requires full funding from Congress, which remains throttled in many respects, even as it has somewhat improved.

Policy-makers have instead supported legislation that promotes the increased availability of guns to people in the United States. They do this in spite of the fact that increasing gun access is not supported by the preponderance of the research, which shows gun violence and deaths vary proportionally to their availability and controls in a given society.

Additionally, they continue to allocate large portions of what little funding is approved to police and security contractors and people who make surveillance equipment, despite the fact that research demonstrates that support for teachers and counselors is more effective.

Examples of Policy Proposals:

• Increase/Promote Gun Ownership
• Control Gun Ownership/Regulate Firearms
• More/Less Guns in Schools
• More/Less Cops in Schools
• Increase mental health treatment/prevent access to firearms
• Increased/Decreased Use of “Stop & Frisk”

Lobbyists for the National Rifle Association (NRA) have spent considerable time and money to discourage legislators from making laws that would mandate the collection and sharing of information related to guns and gun violence. This has had the effect of keeping the public in the dark about facts that are important to understand.

The gun lobby in the United States (the business arm that promotes gun sales thru the funding of politicians who support the same) has used the under-counting of gun accidents involving juveniles to oppose reasonable policies that could help prevent deaths and injuries caused by the careless handling and storage of firearms.

To counteract calls for increased control over weapons, they question the public’s fear of youth-involved gun violence by pointing to statistics that show children are more likely to die in falls or by drowning than from the accidental discharge of a firearm (see The New York Times’ report, which challenged the NRA argument of opposing laws to safely store guns and accompanying efforts to resist developing technology to make weapons childproof).

Sources

CDC Reports on Youth Violence

“Counting the Young Victims of Firearm Violence,” by the Editorial Board of the Washington Post

“I Just Lost My Fourth Student This Year to Gun Violence. I Want to Make Sure He’s the Last, ” by Tammatha Woodhouse as Told to Kerry Shaw, April 7, 2017

“In the South Bronx, Lives Marred and Erased by Firearms,” by James McKinley Jr. and Ashley Southall and Al Baker

“The Most Dangerous Neighborhoods; the Most Inexperienced Cops,” by Andrew Fan

“Mental Illness, Mass Shootings, and the Politics of American Firearms,” by Jonathan M. Metzl and Kenneth T. MacLeish

Angry White Men: Masculinity at the End of an Era, by Michael Kimmel, 2017.

“Why a Rising Number of Criminals are Using Facebook Live to Film Their Acts,” by Olivia Solon

Network Exposure and Homicide Victimization in an African American Community, by Andrew Papachristos and Christopher Wildeman, 2017.

Class, state, and crime: On the theory and practice of criminal justice., by Richard Quinney  (2d ed.) (New York: Longman, 1980).

The New Criminology: For a Social Theory of Deviance, by Ian Taylor, Paul Walton, and Jock Young (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).

Critical Criminology, by Ian Taylor, Paul Walton, and Jock Young (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975).

Discussion Questions

What do you think about Kimmel’s model in terms of its ability to predict gun violence and school shootings? Do you think this model could potentially help identify schools at risk (though perhaps not outright predict) mass shootings and school violence? 

Who owns most of the guns in the united states and what explains the patterns, particularly as this applies to youth access to firearms?

How might we use an “intersectional” framework to call attention to social problems associated with gun violence ( a framework that takes into account interpenetrating social factors like race, social class, and gender)?

What do you think about treating gun violence like a public health crisis? 

Do you personally worry about being a victim of gun violence? If so, would you like it if someone gave you information that could help you make decisions about changing the places, people, and things you do to improve your personal chances of avoiding victimization?

How might social media exacerbate or help with the problem of youth violence? Have you ever witnessed a crime on social media?

Kids for Cash

In what was dubbed the “Kids for Cash” scandal that rocked the state of Pennsylvania in 2008, two judges in Wilkes-Barre were found guilty of accepting judicial kickbacks – upwards of 2.6 million dollars – for sentencing children to a particular developer of private juvenile detention centers from a developer of juvenile detention facilities. In this case, the judges pocketed millions in exchange for sending thousands of children to the facility, located in Luzerne County, Pa. An estimated 6,000 children, where an estimated 1,000 – 2,000 received excess sentences, were impacted by the judges’ crimes.

As for the kids, their offenses were typically minor (i.e swearing, stealing a CD from Walmart). The violations made famous here helped expose the operations of a private prison system that only continues to grow in influence, as its advocates for its for-profit model as a way for states manage their growing prison population. This model, it should be pointed out, is not seen anywhere else in the world. But even this might be changing.

According to the maker of the film documentary, the problem in Wilkes-Barre started with the Columbine shootings. The 1999 massacre in a Colorado high school was instrumental in stoking irrational fears that led school administrators to hand off misbehaving kids to the county.  Consequently, where once a fistfight might have put a juvenile in detention or resulted in a suspension, now children were getting arrested. And because of judges’ strict zero-tolerance policies, they often ended up in shackles.

The companies involved, PA Childcare LLC, Western PA Childcare LLC, and Mid-Atlantic Youth Services Corp., which own and operate the centers in Pittston Twp. and Butler County, all received a stipend from the government for each inmate housed. This created a situation where the detention centers looked for ways to bring more inmates into increase revenue. According to the Juvenile Law Center, a nonprofit organization in Philadelphia, the judges sentenced teenagers to the facilities for simple misdemeanor offenses.

A key development worth noting is that most of those sentenced by judges Ciavarella and Conahan were denied the Constitutional right to an attorney because their probation service told them their misdemeanor crimes did not warrant one. It was only as a result of the judges pushing for particular facilities to house the inmates that caused people to suspect a partnership. It was a stunning abuse of power, and both men were eventually tried and sentenced to long prison terms for treating the children as commodities.

The Victims

Justin Bodnar was sent to juvenile detention when he was 12 years old for using obscene language during an incident with another student’s mother. It put his sent his life in a downward spiral. It was in juvenile where he tried marijuana and heroin for the first time. Now in his early 20s, Bodnar is trying to get his life back on track. His story is just one of several told in the documentary.

Hillary Transue, who created a fake MySpace page to lampoon a teacher.

Ed Kenzakoski, a high school wrestler, was detained for having drug paraphernalia in his truck. Kenzakoski never recovered from the experience. He became a different person and got into trouble again, this time as an adult. He took his life in 2010.

People often find it easy to say things like “juveniles who make mistakes should be taught a tough lesson.” The stories of most of those featured in Kids for Cash may be unusual in that they were prosecuted for minor or questionable offenses, but most young people sentenced to some form of detention are status offenders, meaning that they have committed offenses that would not be crimes if they were adults.

The Judges and Conspirators

In the documentary film, former judge Michael Conahan was shown admitting to his crime and accepting a plea agreement, though he was left to await sentencing; on September 23, 2011, he was sentenced to 17.5 years in prison and ordered to pay 874,000 dollars in restitution.

Unlike Conahan, former judge Mark Ciavarella did not accept a plea agreement and completely denied allegations of his involvement in the kids-for-cash scam. He and his family went as far as accusing Conahan of lying about the scam. They claimed Ciavarella was being falsely accused of a crime he did not commit. As a result, he was sentenced to 28 years in prison, 10.5 more years than Conahan. Had he admitted to his crimes, Ciavarella may have had a lesser sentence similar to that of Conahan.

Ciavarella was found guilty of twelve of thirty-nine federal felonies including racketeering, mail fraud, money laundering, fraud conspiracy and filing false tax returns.

Disgraced Hazelton attorney Robert J. Powell, who arranged to pay the judges $770, 000, lost his yacht, jet, and Mountain Top mansion in the aftermath of the Kids for Cash scandal; he was sentenced to 18 months in jail, which he completed in 2013. A racketeering lawsuit was filed against Powell last year by Gregory Zappala, his former business partner in two private juvenile detention centers at the center of the scandal; in exchange for dismissal from that suit, Powell agreed to pay $4.75 million and possibly up to $2.5 million more based on his net worth calculated by the end of 2016.

Robert Mericle of Mericle Construction, a builder of for-profit youth detention centers, built the centers with Zappala’s PA Child Care, LLC, and other entities involved in the ownership and operation of the centers located in Pittston Township and western Pennsylvania. He was sentenced to a year in federal prison. Additionally, Mericle received a $250,000 fine and 100 hours of community service. He was also sentenced for lying about his involvement in the “kids for cash scandal,” in which he paid a total of $2.1 million for judges to send juveniles to his detention centers.

In 2009, Mericle also pleaded guilty to failure to disclose a felony, after he initially refused to admit he had paid [the] $2.1 million. He faced up to an additional three years in prison, but this sentence was reduced as part of his plea agreement. It is worth pointing out that Mericle did not actually break any laws by paying the judges. The judges, however, committed a crime by accepting the money.

Watch a preview of the documentary here:

The Final Payout

A series of class action lawsuits were filed in the case that had victims are seeking millions of dollars in compensation. A total of 1,187 juveniles and 605 parents filed claims to receive settlement money. The actual payouts began in December of 2015.

Robert Powell was ordered to pay 4.5 million dollars in restitution. He was the co-owner of two private juvenile justice facilities and served an 18-month prison term after admitting that he paid bribes to former Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark Ciavarella Jr. and his boss, Judge Michael Conahan. The victims and their families won additional millions in judgments from Mericle and Powell’s companies. Additional class-action claims were filed against Ciavarella and Conahan.

Settlements of more than $20 million were reached with defendant Robert K. Mericle and Mericle Construction.

The two former judges, even if they are sued for compensation, are serving federal prison sentences; thus, it remains questionable and even doubtful that they would be able to make payments to victims.

What Can We Learn From This?

There are a lot of lessons to be learned here. Chief among them is that the long-term effects of detention, in this case, illustrated that kids don’t “learn their lesson” so much as detention caused them to sink into a deep depression, which caused even more difficult as they were forced to contend with confinement-induced post-traumatic stress.

Recidivism was a problem too. Once the kids finished their sentences, the tiniest infractions would land them back in juvenile detention, where they might learn a thing or two from each other about doing drugs, how to steal more effectively, or even build a bomb, all while they cultivated a deep hatred for authority.

Not everyone benefits from positive social influences and family support. Recognizing that anyone of us could have been one of the children who became victims in the “kids for cash” scandal, we should heed the warning and approach juvenile justice in a very different way. Punishing kids is not like punishing adults. And if you do it wrong, you might end up with a career criminal and, even worse, a dead kid.

The purpose of the juvenile justice system, as established by Pennsylvania law, is reform and treatment – not punishment. Furthermore, there is a large body of evidence-based research that demonstrates the effectiveness of programs that are designed to keep young offenders from becoming repeat offenders. The same holds true for programs that allow youth to seek expungement of their records after their sentence is served.

The aim here is to help juveniles continue to pursue education and employment opportunities – opportunities they may otherwise be denied with a record hanging over their heads.

Prisons for Profit – the Prison Industrial Complex

Thus far, the Pennsylvania case is the only prosecuted case of judicial corruption and partnership with a private prison firm in the US.  The influence of for-profit correctional centers, however, extends far beyond those who uphold the law to those who write the laws as well. In Arizona, the idea of a private prison to house illegal immigrants wooed lawmakers and corporations alike. Then-state senator, Russell Pearce (R), crafted the bill not with other lawmakers, but with the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a membership organization of legislators and corporations.

In the state of Arizona, the concept of using private prison to house illegal immigrants has risen to new heights. Lawmakers, including the state governor, have been showered with thousands of dollars to influence their support for the process. Former state senator, Russell Pearce (R), crafted a bill to address immigrant detention not with other lawmakers and experts, but with the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a membership organization of legislators and corporations. One of ALEC’s most prominent members is CCA (Corrections Corporation of America), the main organization that benefitted from the compensation paid to Ciavarella and Conahan for assigning juveniles to its facilities.

In the United States today, private companies operate 264 correctional facilities that house nearly 100,000 adult convicts. In a time when approximately 13 million Americans find themselves in a jail during any given year, six million of those end up in “correctional supervision,” more than in Joseph Stalin’s gulags. With that adding up to one in every 100 Americans being incarcerated, public prisons are running over capacity.

At the end of 2009, 19 states were operating at 100 percent or more of their highest capacity measure and the federal prison system was operating at 140 percent of capacity. Worthy of note is how all of this occurred during a period of time in which violent crime rates have fallen in the US, even as the nation’s incarceration rate has tripled since 1980.

The nations new jailers are now private prison corporations (private probation is on the rise too). Companies like CCA and the recently renamed GEO Group (now Abraxis) use their ever-increasing purchasing power to sway government legislators as part of a process of capitalizing on the prisoner overflow/overcrowding issues in public prisons. These two groups are the largest private prison operators in the United States, generating revenues of over $70 billion dollars.

Immigrant Detention – The New Cash Cow

The following article is written by Madison Pauly an originally appeared in Mother Jones Magazine

Immigration agents sparked panic across the country when a series of high-profile operations made it clear that a new era of crackdowns on undocumented immigrants had begun. Coming on the heels of a couple of major executive orders on immigration, the arrests and deportations were a very public reminder of President Donald Trump’s promise to deport upwards of 2 million immigrants upon taking office.

But given that America’s detention system for immigrants has been running at full capacity for some time now, where is the president going to put all of these people before deporting them?

In new jails, for starters. In the same executive order that called for the construction of a southern border wall, Trump instructed Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to build out its sprawling network of immigration detention centers. Starting “immediately,” his order said, ICE should construct new facilities, lease space for immigrants alongside inmates in existing local jails, and sign new contracts—likely with private prison companies. The scale of that expansion became clearer on February 5, when the Los Angeles Times reported on a memo handed down in late January from White House immigration experts to top Homeland Security officials. The document called for raising the number of immigrants ICE incarcerates daily, nationwide, to 80,000 people.

Last year, ICE detained more than 352,000 people. The number of detainees held each day, typically between 31,000 and 34,000, reached a historic high of about 41,000 people in the fall, as Customs and Border Protection apprehended more people on the southwest border while seeing a simultaneous rise in asylum seekers. But doubling the daily capacity to 80,000 “would require ICE to sprint to add more capacity than the agency has ever added in its entire history,” says Carl Takei, staff attorney for the ACLU’s National Prison Project. It would also take an extra $2 billion in government funding per year, detention experts interviewed by Mother Jones estimated. And, Takei warned, “we don’t know if 80,000 is where he’ll stop.”

Yet even if ICE does not adopt an 80,000-person detention quota, other changes laid out in Trump’s executive orders suggest that vastly more people will be detained in the coming months and years. For example, Trump ordered ICE to prioritize deporting not only immigrants who been convicted or charged with crimes, but also those who had “committed acts that constitute a chargeable offense”—a category that could include entering the country illegally and driving without a license. Trump also ordered Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly, who oversees ICE, to take “all appropriate actions” to detain undocumented immigrants while their cases are pending.

Beyond that, ICE could stop granting parole to asylum seekers, explains Margo Schlanger, a former Obama administration official who served as Homeland Security’s top authority on civil rights. With ICE taking enforcement action against more categories of immigration offenders and releasing fewer of them, Schlanger says, “we could get to a very large sum of people in detention very quickly.”

It’s not difficult to guess who profits. In an earnings call last week, the private prison giant CoreCivic (formerly known as the Corrections Corporation of America, or CCA) announced that it saw the ICE detention expansion as a business opportunity. “When coupled with the above average rate of crossings along the southwest border, these executive orders appear likely to significantly increase the need for safe, humane, and appropriate detention bed capacity that we have available,” CoreCivic President and CEO Damon Hininger said.

As of November, a whopping 65 percent of ICE detainees were held in facilities run by private prison companies, which typically earn a fee per detainee per night and whose business model depends upon minimizing costs to return profits to their shareholders. Since Trump’s election, private prison stocks have soared, and two new, for-profit detention centers are opening in Georgia and Texas.

Making $$$$ Out of Misery

Private Prison Industry Licking it’s Chops Over Trump’s Deportation Plans,” by Madison Pauly

Discussion Questions

Were you familiar with the concept of “prisons for profit?” What do you think about the potential conflict of interest that may be inherent in running prisons for profit?

Would you ever consider working for a for-profit prison or probation agency?

During the Obama Presidency, legislation was implemented to curtail the growth of for-profit prisons; the Trump administration reversed this decision and is actively pursuing a policy of fostering the growth of the private prison industry. What does the research say about outcomes (i.e. time served, recidivism) when prisons are managed by private corporations?

What does the research say about outcomes (i.e. time served, recidivism) when prisons are managed by private corporations?

Some people like to think of prison as a form of government-subsidized public housing. What do you think?

What do you think about the moral argument of locking people up for profit?

What products do you own/use that are produced by prisoners? Take a quick personal inventory and discuss!

This article and others in this series were produced as part of a project for the University of Southern California Center for Health Journalism’s National Fellowship, in conjunction with the USC Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism. Link to video depicted above.

Fight Club: Dark secrets of Florida Juvenile Justice

By Carol Marbin Miller and Audra D.S. Burch, Miami Herald; Wednesday, October 11, 2017

The boys had just returned to Module 9 of the Miami juvenile lockup from the dining hall when one of them hit Elord Revolte high and hard. More of the boys jumped in, punching and slamming him over and over, then pile-driving his 135-pound body.

One called it an “A-town Stomp,” and demonstrated to detectives by jumping on the floor with both feet.

Elord, 17, fought back gamely. “I swung a punch,” said the youth who struck him with the first blow. “I hit him. He swung two punches. He hit me. I swung one punch and then I grabbed his shirt and hit him again. Then I slammed him on his head and I hit him. … All my friends, they start jumping over the chairs, while Elord was on the floor and they went to stomping on him.”

When Elord rose from the 68-second thrashing — every kick and punch meted out in front of a surveillance camera — he was too angry to know his own hurt. He said all he wanted was to kill the boys who had brutalized him.

Thirty hours later, Elord was the one dead, the result of internal bleeding from that mauling, which two of the youths said was instigated by a detention officer.

Elord Revolte’s death evokes many of the dark secrets of Florida’s troubled juvenile justice system, including incompetent supervision, questionable healthcare, willfully blind internal investigations and spasms of staff-induced violence, sometimes bought for the price of a pastry.

The lack of accountability has left children in peril, unfit employees in charge and parents frustrated, frightened and sometimes grieving.

“They treated my child worse than a dog,” said Enoch Revolte, Elord’s father. “My child wasn’t a dog. My son deserves justice.”

He didn’t get it. No one was held to account.

Not the dozen-plus boys who ambushed Elord.

Not the detention officer identified by a detainee as ordering up the attack because Elord had mouthed off minutes earlier.

Not the nurses who waited a day to get Elord to the hospital as he oozed blood internally.

Not the administrators who failed, despite repeated warnings, to supply juvenile lockups with modern surveillance equipment.

Spurred by the death of Elord Revolte on Aug. 31, 2015, at least the 12th questionable juvenile detainee death since 2000, the Miami Herald embarked on a sweeping investigation of juvenile justice in Florida.

Reporters examined both state-run juvenile detention centers, essentially jails for kids ages 13 to 18 who are accused of crimes, as well as the state’s residential “programs,” prison-like institutions where they are sent by judges to serve sentences and receive treatment. The latter are privately run, but funded and overseen by the state.

Herald journalists examined 10 years of Department of Juvenile Justice incident reports, inspector general investigations and administrative reviews, restraint records, police files and court cases, state inspections, child welfare and prison records, emails, personnel files, surveillance video and handwritten witness and victims’ statements. They conducted scores of interviews with administrators, public defenders, prosecutors, judges, children’s advocates, consultants, parents and youths across Florida. They toured a half-dozen programs in two states and observed juvenile court cases.

The investigation found that for years — long before Elord’s death — youths have complained of staff turning them into hired mercenaries, offering honey buns and other rewards to rough up fellow detainees. It is a way for employees to exert control without risking their livelihoods by personally resorting to violence. Criminal charges are rare.

Of the 12 questionable deaths since 2000, including an asphyxiation, a violent takedown by staff, a hanging, a youth-on-youth beating and untreated illnesses or injuries, none has resulted in an employee serving a day in prison.

DJJ Secretary Christina K. Daly said her agency does not tolerate the mistreatment of youth in its care. “The Florida Department of Juvenile Justice has been and continues to be committed to reform of the juvenile justice system in Florida. We have worked over the past six years to ensure that youths receive the right services in the right place and that our programs and facilities are nurturing and safe for the youths placed in our custody,” she said.

Summary of Findings

• Unnecessary and excessive force used by officers and youth care workers, who outsource discipline by using detainees as enforcers
• Sexual misconduct by staff that goes unreported
• Neglect of medical needs; teens were called “fakers” when they were ill
• Widespread tolerance for cover-ups
• Faulty security cameras

Problems in the System

Low pay, low morale, and poor working conditions were cited as contributing to problems throughout the Florida system. State pay for detention officers starts at $12.25 an hour. Many who are hired lack the proper experience to protect and supervise youths often dealing with mental illnesses, drug addiction, disabilities and the lingering effects of trauma. Put another way, annual salaries are in the area of $25,479.22 a year for a new recruit. The Legislature hasn’t addressed pay rates since 2006 — although it did give current staff a $1,400 raise on Oct. 1, 2017, starting salaries remained the same.

When Florida handed over its residential programs to private contractors, it gave up the ability to regulate pay for employees (unless stipulated in the contract). The contractor, TrueCore Behavioral Solutions, operates 28 Florida programs, more than any other company — it offers new hires $19,760.

Whereas many states insist that employment candidates have college degrees, Florida does not. Workers fired for wrongdoing in recent years have included a former brick mason, furniture salesman, mail sorter, sales rep, a machinist and a boxer. Many staffers share one trait: intimidating bulk.

Personnel screening is, likewise a problem. Individuals with records of violence and sexual abuse have not faced barriers to employment with the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice and its private agencies that operate residential compounds for kids.

The investigation found that hundreds of previously employed prison guards were hired, including individuals who lost their jobs for sexually abusive treatment of colleagues, “improper relationships” with inmates, smuggling in contraband and sleeping on the job.

Panhandle Purgatory

Florida’s youth corrections system has been a source of shame and scandal since its inception. The Arthur G. Dozier School for Boys, the state’s first reform school, was opened in the Panhandle in 1900 as a reform-minded experiment in “intellectual and moral training.” Three years later, boys were found chained in irons.

The state has been the subject of blistering grand jury reports, defended countless lawsuits, ramped up and slashed funding, designed and redesigned new programs — only to see the same abuses recur.

Despite the periodic outrages, those in the juvenile justice system have never gotten the same attention as abused and neglected children — although they are, in many cases, the same children, simply grown older and more damaged.

TrueCore, the private contractor, researched its detainee population. It reported that incarcerated girls are four times more likely than their non-delinquent peers — and boys three-and-a-half times more likely — to have experienced traumas such as abuse and neglect.

For generations, Florida juvenile justice programs were interwoven with the state’s child welfare system in a mammoth department called Health and Rehabilitative Services. The agency operated under a social services model, with foster care and delinquency programs governed by a child’s best interests. That philosophy remained in place even after delinquency programs were spun off in 1994.

But in 2000, the agency turned toward punishment when the Legislature approved an overhaul called “Tough Love.” As Florida grappled with a surge in violent youthful crime, a wave that jeopardized the state’s tourism lifeblood, the emphasis was on “tough.”

“We stopped seeing young people as somebody’s child, but rather as predators to be feared. And the way you deal with a predator is the opposite of how you deal with a child who has made a poor decision,” said Jim DeBeaugrine, an HRS legislative analyst from 1988 to 1997, and then staff director for the state Justice Appropriations Committee until 2007.

The 2000s saw two dramatic shifts: From 2008 until this year, the number of juveniles who entered the system’s custodial care plummeted from 41,002 to 19,491. The reduction coincided with a nationwide drop in youth crime, along with a 2011 Florida law — championed by DJJ — that encouraged police to issue civil citations to some nonviolent youthful offenders instead of arresting them.

At the same time, the Legislature privatized all juvenile justice commitment programs — the brick-and-mortar facilities where youths serve out their sentences. Daly, the DJJ secretary, says this outsourcing has led to greater efficiency and accountability, and more humane conditions.

A 2015 Polk County grand jury report following a riot at Highlands Youth Academy — named Avon Park at the time — saw it differently.

The riot started over a bet on a basketball game. The stakes: a packet of Lipton Cup-a-Soup. The losers refused to pay. Approximately 150 law enforcement officers were deployed, including a SWAT team. Sixty-one juveniles were arrested.
After examining the uprising at the program for boys with mental illnesses or drug addictions, the grand jury labeled it “disgraceful.”

“The buildings are in disrepair and not secured, the juvenile delinquents are improperly supervised and receive no meaningful tools to not re-offend, the staff is woefully undertrained and ill-equipped to handle the juveniles in their charge, and the safety of the public is at risk,” the report said.

The grand jurors noted that boys were running wild, living in buildings with leaky roofs — one still had a blue tarp — because they were never repaired after Hurricane Wilma a decade earlier. The report pointed out that British-based G4S, the for-profit company then running the youth program, had been paid $40 million over five years, including a 9 percent profit margin, or about $800,000 in profit that year alone, to run the camp.

“While the citizens are essentially being ripped off,” the report said, “the juveniles are being even more poorly served.”

G4S was sent detailed information about what the Herald was preparing to publish in this report. The company, which has spun off its juvenile contracts to TrueCore, a firm run by former employees, did not respond.

Fast Food and False Promises

Amid the downsizing, residential programs like Avon Park/Highlands — and the lockups, where youths await adjudication and sometimes scarce beds in the residential programs — have remained a source of trouble. The trouble ranges from improper “restraints” — forcible takedowns by staff — to ham-handed efforts to prevent detainees from reporting abuse.

Fort Myers Youth Academy has been a microcosm, steeped in violence and a culture of coercive cover-ups. The program was placed under a “corrective action plan” in September 2014 after it was found to be manhandling too many detainees.

Rather than stanch the abuse, the head of Fort Myers, Michael Mathews, went to extreme lengths to prevent it from being reported, DJJ inspector general records show.

Staffers told investigators they were forbidden from reporting anything to the state child abuse hotline without permission of administrators — a violation of DJJ policy, which mandates the reporting of abuse and requires that detainees have access to the hotline. Youths claimed they were pressured or bribed — one youth said with chips — to keep their mouths shut.

In April 2015, a 17-year-old clashed with Davis Rios, a youth care worker hired by Fort Myers after he was allowed to resign from his prison job. He’d initially been fired from the prison position for sexual harassment.

Rios swept the detainee’s legs out from under him, tossing him to the floor, wrote Christopher Geraci, a supervisor who witnessed it. Rios then bent the boy’s fingers backward and twisted his shoulder joint behind his back, “causing him to scream in pain.”

The youth had recently broken his jaw, and it was tender. Rios, exploiting the injury, gnashed an elbow into the teen’s wired jaw, eliciting a howl of pain, records show. The boy was “crying and begging Rios to stop.” The teen said Rios had “tried to break his arm.”

When it was over, the youth had his teeth knocked out of place, and his mouth dripped blood. He was sent to the emergency room with a shoulder injury, “multiple” deep bruises and internal bleeding.

Such “pain compliance” moves, permissible in adult prisons, have been banned by DJJ for more than a decade.

Geraci wrote a three-page report describing how Rios “became physically aggressive,” how he had done a “pain compliance technique on [the] youth’s fingers,” and how he’d twisted the teen’s shoulder, “causing him to scream in pain.” And it said he kept going even after Geraci ordered him to stop.

Mathews demanded a rewrite, Geraci later would tell investigators. The statement went from a three-page narrative to one paragraph devoid of detail. Geraci also refrained from calling the abuse hotline as mandated, later explaining: Staff “are prohibited from doing so.”

Mathews “offered no explanation as to why the Abuse Hotline was not contacted after medical documentation supported [Geraci’s claim] that staff Rios manipulated youth’s shoulder with the intent to inflict pain,” the report said. Nonetheless, a DJJ lawyer concluded that there was “no intent on his part to mislead the department.”

The episode remained buried for three months, until DJJ investigators came to Fort Myers to look into another takedown. Soon, more complaints surfaced, including a kid who suffered a dislodged tooth and possible “roof fracture” when he refused to give up his lunch tray, a youth who claimed he was yanked out of bed and beaten for oversleeping, and a report from a teen of “bounties” being offered for beatings.

On Oct. 23, 2015, an inspector general investigator wrote a report in which detainees described widespread abuse and frequent cover-ups. The program physician, Dr. Hala Fakhre, said she was told administrators dissuaded detainees from reporting physical abuse. A former staff nurse, Kandis Kelting, said she quit because of excessive violence and “youths being called liars.”

One boy said Mathews “bribed him with fast food … and false promises” — such as a reduced stay — to hide abuse.

“Things tend to get swept under the rug,” Geraci said in an inspector general report.

Those things included the surveillance footage of Rios’ April 2015 “pain compliance” restraint. Mathews didn’t preserve the video, later explaining that he viewed the video himself and saw “no excessive use of force.”

Rios was terminated in November 2015. Mathews was fired the following year — after he failed to report another restraint. Neither could be reached by the Herald.

The totality of complaints resulted in another “corrective action plan,” this one stipulating that the program report abuse “100 percent of the time.”

Turning a Blind Eye

For going on 20 years, investigators have been dutifully reporting concerns over the system’s outdated surveillance cameras. In July and August of 2000, two Miami-Dade officers were found to have beaten detainees with a broomstick. One boy was hurt, but in both cases the lockup “failed to ensure the video equipment was operating correctly, which prevented review” of the allegations.

The next year, an investigation into a Pinellas County girl’s injured shoulder was thwarted by inoperable cameras.

On June 9, 2003, 17-year-old Omar Paisley died of a ruptured appendix at the Miami-Dade lockup after begging for help for three days. A grand jury later complained that most of the video cameras weren’t working, and those that did “allowed only for real-time monitoring.”

Investigations into the deaths of two other youths, as well as the rape of a third, also were hamstrung by poor surveillance equipment. Shawn Smith, 13, hanged himself while under suicide watch in Volusia County. Daniel “Danny” Matthews, 17, died after being punched by another Pinellas County detainee. And a severely disabled 16-year-old was placed in the care of a sex offender, a detainee deputized to change his diaper. In that instance, the Tallahassee lockup’s tapes vanished before investigators could view them.

In some programs, the equipment was upgraded — but officers quickly learned the blind spots.

At the Okeechobee Youth Correctional Center, the “sub control” center, a glassed-in enclosure, is not covered by cameras, and the glass is darkly tinted. Police said that is where youth worker Mackell Williams brought a 15-year-old on Aug. 16, 2012, to beat him up.

A witness reported that Williams repeatedly punched the boy, then hoisted him in a “bear hug” and slammed him to the floor on his head. The 15-year-old crumpled and initially remained motionless. A co-worker told investigators she “thought the youth might have broken his neck.”

A detainee suggested that the teen needed medical attention, but workers “refused to notify anyone from medical,” a report said. One staffer dabbed the boy’s bloody head with napkins.

He was, in fact, badly hurt. The teen passed out in a classroom the next day from an apparent seizure and was diagnosed at a hospital with head and neck injuries. He returned to Okeechobee only to lose consciousness three days later — and then suffer another seizure the day after that.

DJJ and child abuse investigators concluded that Williams and two others had medically neglected the boy. They also determined that Williams had physically abused him. He was charged with misdemeanor battery.

Williams, six feet tall and stocky, wrote in a statement that the youth was the aggressor and he was “thrown around” by him while he begged the boy to “please let go.” He was acquitted four months later.

Managing the surveillance cameras throughout the juvenile justice system has long been a struggle, DJJ’s Daly said, forcing administrators to balance security needs against privacy rights. “You want kids to have the privacy in their room; you want them to have the privacy in the bathroom,” she told the Herald. She added that the agency can replace the equipment only as its budget allows.

“We are constantly replacing those cameras and the systems. There are a lot that are outdated, and we just have to prioritize and do them as we can,” Daly said. DJJ bought 135 cameras for its detention centers in June 2015 — along with new hard drives and other equipment — and another 100 security cameras the following May. About one-third of those were installed in Miami. Another 40 wide-angle cameras were installed in Miami later that year.

“It would be inaccurate to say DJJ does not take our facility safety seriously,” Daly said.

On a Scale of 1 to 10: ‘Twenty’

The Miami-Dade Regional Juvenile Detention Center cameras were working on the afternoon in 2015 when more than a dozen boys in Module 9 used Elord Revolte as a punching bag. But they weren’t working very well.

The lockup was Elord’s last stop in an odyssey that began at Miami International Airport. He ran away from the airport, fearing that his father was planning to take him to Haiti and leave him there. Elord ended up in a Miami Beach foster home. He ran away from there, too, and had been spotted by other foster kids smoking marijuana in South Beach. His foster mother reported him missing but said authorities didn’t seem interested.

“Nobody really cared,” said Jolie Bogorad.

They did care when, according to police, he and another youth took a man’s cellphone at gunpoint. Elord was arrested Aug. 28, 2015. In general, detainees are sent to the lockup for 21 days to await trial or release, though the time can be extended. Elord lasted three.

Enoch Revolte said he spoke with his son by phone not long before the attack. “He said, ‘Dad, I love you a lot.’

“I told him, ‘If you loved me, you would not be where you are.’ I was trying to practice tough love.”

Those words, among his last to his son, haunt him.

More haunting were the events late in the afternoon on Aug. 31. Elord “stood up without permission” in the lockup cafeteria to get a carton of milk, according to the police report. Detention officer Antwan Johnson told him to sit down. Elord cursed at Johnson, who cut dinnertime short for everyone.

One detainee, 16-year-old L.B., told police he overheard Johnson instruct another boy, T.R., to “punish [Elord] for his misconduct,” prosecutors wrote in a memo that identifies the juveniles only by their initials. “Johnson told the youth, [T.R.], to hit him,” L.B. said.

The boys from Module 9 returned from the dining hall at about 5:33 p.m. Policy dictated that they stand in front of their doors, but they milled around a set of blue plastic chairs in the dayroom, preparing to watch a movie. Video shows two officers present. Johnson is entering a closet. Boris Valcin walks away.

Neither is in position to see what happens next: T.R. slugs Elord in the jaw. Elord’s arms flail in the air.

Valcin continues to walk away when at least a half-dozen detainees leapfrog chairs and converge on Elord. Others join the attack. By the time Valcin turns around, Elord is swallowed by a blur of kicking khaki. Valcin radios a Code Blue, or fight. Johnson enters the scrum and begins to peel off one youth. All told, the assault goes on for 68 seconds.

“The guards was grabbing them and, like, throwing them,” 16-year-old T.R. told police, “but they kept coming back.”

“Stop!” Elord yelled. As staffers disengaged the remaining attackers, at least one stomped Elord’s chest a final time.

When it was over, Elord rose to his feet and declared: “I’m straight.”

Another detainee, D.V., would support L.B.’s claim that the assault was “induced” by a staffer, and said that the attackers were offered food and extra phone calls as rewards. He said he overheard the boys say so.

Elord was placed on concussion alert, and was supposed to be monitored for “repeated vomiting, dizziness, headache, visual disturbances, seizures, confusion, or unusual drowsiness.” DJJ’s inspector general said those instructions were disregarded. Indeed, “no staff had contact” with Elord for hours.

At 10:19 the next morning, Elord told an officer “his chest was stabbing him and he could not breathe.” A supervisor replied that Elord “already had submitted a sick-call.”

When the same officer checked on him later, Elord was “clutching his chest” and asked to see a nurse. The officer told him to be patient. A nurse said he’d be right over but never arrived.

At 3:40 p.m., shortly after shift change, staff called a Code White — medical emergency — and Elord was taken to the nurse’s station. He said he “felt like something was broken in his chest, and it was hard for him to breathe.” The staff did not call for an ambulance, and it took more than an hour for officers to arrange for a van.

Asked to describe his pain on a scale of 1 to 10, Elord replied: “Twenty.”

5:17 p.m.: Elord is checked in at Jackson Memorial Hospital’s emergency room. He says he has abdominal pain. He vomits.

10:40 p.m.: Elord stands over a garbage can and points toward his throat, unable to breathe. In full cardiac arrest, Elord falls into the arms of a nurse.

11:17 p.m.: Elord is pronounced dead.

The medical examiner catalogued his injuries — some overtly evident, some not. His left eye was bruised and swollen; he had an L-shaped scrape to the right side of his face, several red-brown scrapes and a purple bruise on his neck, and bruises to his shoulder. He bled from his thyroid, trachea, both lungs, adrenal gland, rib area and heart.

A tear to a vein under Elord’s left shoulder — which slowly oozed his lifeblood — was the cause of death, along with other “blunt force injury” to his head, neck and chest. It was “a highly unusual injury … more associated with a motor vehicle collision than a fight,” prosecutors quoted the medical examiner as saying.

Manner of death: homicide

The state attorney’s office cast about for someone to charge. Prosecutors considered Johnson, but concluded they couldn’t prove the officer ordered the assault, which he denied.

Nor, they determined, could the youths be prosecuted. Though investigators watched the kicks and punches unfold on the blurry, herky-jerky video, they could not say who delivered the fatal blow. Surveillance equipment was “significantly outdated,” prosecutors wrote. The cameras would need to capture 30 frames per second but recorded only seven.

When technicians tried to zero in, the images muddied. DJJ said it has upgraded the surveillance system.

The state attorney said the lockup’s shoddy record-keeping further complicated matters. The day log is unclear as to how many detainees were in the module. That complicated the task of identifying attackers and witnesses.

T.R. told investigators he punched Elord as payback for an earlier fight, though no such fight had been documented and prosecutors suggested he made that up. Multiple detainees acknowledged jumping in for no particular reason, but they weren’t charged with assault, much less homicide.

After itemizing the lockup’s “inadequacies,” the state attorney’s office concluded they were “beyond the scope of this memorandum, but must surely be addressed.”

In an interview with the Herald, Daly said DJJ has emphasized that detainees can never be deputized to enforce discipline. “I can tell you right now that it is absolutely unacceptable for any of that to happen. I have been very clear with our staff. We’ve had numerous conversations. That is not accepted. It is not an acceptable practice. Period.”

Inexplicably, the state attorney memo closing out the case says Antwan Johnson was terminated for unrelated matters. In fact, he remains on staff.

“These allegations were the subject of investigations by both the Inspector General’s Office of the Florida Department of Juvenile of Justice and the Public Corruption Unit of the Miami-Dade State Attorney’s Office. Neither of these extensive investigations found Mr. Johnson culpable in the incident,” DJJ said in a statement last week.

Reporters attempted directly and through the department to contact Antwan Johnson but did not succeed.

Revolte expressed shock when a reporter told him that no one would be punished for his son’s death.

“What do you mean?” he asked in Creole. “I cannot understand. This cannot happen. This cannot happen.”

T.R., who freely admitted striking the first blow in the savage attack, was soon freed.

Miami Epilogue

Because his initial explanation made no sense, the state attorney’s office intended to go back and interview T.R. one last time after his release. They thought he might feel freer to talk without fear of retribution by the detention center staff. But on Oct. 18, 2015, less than two months after Elord’s death, T.R. and a friend were shot while standing outside a Southwest Miami-Dade apartment. T.R. was wounded in the leg. The friend was killed. Prosecutors decided to let it go.

The Herald learned that the U.S. Justice Department subpoenaed records of some of the detention center staff involved in the incident, including Johnson.

At least one of the detainees present during the fatal beating was called to testify before a grand jury. Progress, if any, in that investigation is unknown.

T.R. is now in a Miami-Dade adult jail, charged with murder. Police say he shot 31-year-old Alquehen “Sean” Webb Jr., with a Glock .40-caliber handgun on Jan. 10, 2016, as the man sat in a car smoking marijuana. T.R.’s lawyer, Arthur Wallace, said it is a “weak case” and “there’s a good chance he’s completely innocent.”

T.R. is Tyvontae Robinson. He was never identified by name in the police, prosecutorial or juvenile justice records obtained by the Herald pertaining to the lockup brawl. Only his nickname — his handle in the lockup — was disclosed. Fellow detainees called him “Honey Smack.”

PostScript

The state claims juvenile arrests are at a 30-year low in Florida — but neglects to mention that crime overall is at a 30-year-low both state- and nationwide. The DJJ noted the Pew Charitable Trusts recently gave the Florida child detention system an award for implementing “evidence-based” programming to help reduce teen recidivism (Iannelli).

But the state’s claims of unfair reporting don’t hold up under the tiniest bit of scrutiny. Even if Florida ran the best juvenile prison system in America, that’s not good enough: In 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a statement demanding that “every youth prison in the country” be shuttered. After a litany of child rapes, beatings, and deaths in Florida, it’s not difficult to see why (Iannelli).

Sources

“Fight Club: Dark Secrets of Florida Juvenile Justice,” by Carol Marbin Miller and Audra D.S. Burch, Miami Herald, October 2017.

“After Herald Catches Prison Guards Running Child “Fight Clubs,” State Attacks Reporters,” by Jerry Iannelli, October 2017.

Questions

Beatings, rape, molestation, and the Florida justice system let almost every guard involved walk away free without consequences; judges continue to send juveniles into the system despite reported problems. What steps do you think might be taken to bring reforms to the juvenile justice system in Florida?

What about other states? How might citizens ensure institutional accountability for adhering to laws and practices governing custodial care of juveniles?

Boys Don’t Cry – Erasing the Emotional Lives of Boys & Men

Despite the emergence of the metrosexual and an increase in stay-at-home dads, tough-guy stereotypes die hard. As men continue to fall behind women in college, while outpacing them four to one in the suicide rate, some colleges are waking up to the fact that men may need to be taught to think beyond their own stereotypes.

Traditionally, if sex education happens at all, American curricula tend to focus on physical acts and dangers – disease and pregnancy – often eschewing positive discussions of sexual pleasure or emotional intimacy.

Feminist scholars have critiqued American sex education for its overemphasis of danger and risk, noting the cost to teenage girls. Scholars have argued that the “missing discourse” of girls’ desire impedes their sense of power in and outside of relationships, leaving them poorly equipped to negotiate consent, safety, and sexual satisfaction.

But scholars have paid less attention to the missing discourse of teenage love in American sex education, and its effects on boys, who confront a broader culture that provides scant recognition of, or support for, their emotional needs.

In comparison, sex education in the Netherlands tends to frame boys’ and girls’ sexual development in the context of their feelings for and relationships with others. Curricula include discussions of fun and exciting feelings. They also validate young people’s experience of love.

The Patriarchy Hurts Men Too

Andrew Reiner talks about the damage that can be done to young boys, when American culture puts so much emphasis on “being a man.” Which is to say – not a girl. He wrote the following in an article for the New York Times:

“Last semester, a student in the masculinity course I teach showed a video clip she had found online of a toddler getting what appeared to be his first vaccinations. Off camera, we hear his father’s voice. “I’ll hold your hand, O.K.?” Then, as his son becomes increasingly agitated: “Don’t cry!… Aw, big boy! High five, high five! Say you’re a man: ‘I’m a man!’ ” The video ends with the whimpering toddler screwing up his face in anger and pounding his chest. “I’m a man!” he barks through tears and gritted teeth.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tT7t_rKSMxk

“The home video,” says Reiner, “was right on point, illustrating the takeaway for the course: how boys are taught, sometimes with the best of intentions, to mutate their emotional suffering into anger. More immediately, it captured, in profound concision, the earliest stirrings of a male identity at war with itself.”

Reiner continues:

“By the time many young men do reach college, a deep-seated gender stereotype has taken root that feeds into the stories they have heard about themselves as learners. Better to earn your Man Card than to succeed like a girl, all in the name of constantly having to prove an identity to yourself and others. I wanted the course to explore this hallmark of the masculine psyche — the shame over feeling any sadness, despair or strong emotion other than anger, let alone expressing it and the resulting alienation. Many young men…[sic learn to] compose artful, convincing masks, but deep down they aren’t who they pretend to be. But wouldn’t encouraging men to embrace the full range of their humanity also benefit women too? Why do we continue to limit the emotional lives of males when it serves no one?”

 

To continue reading, you can access the full article on the Times website here

The “Bro Code”

Reiner goes on to write about the time that sociologist and noted “Bro Whisperer” Michael Kimmel visited his campus in Towson Maryland to speak about the “Bro Code” of collegiate male etiquette.

Kimmel has been teaching courses on masculinity for 25 years. He’s written two popular books attempting to decipher male behavior, Angry White Men and Guyland, the latter of which explores, among other things, the so-called bro culture on college campuses. Soon, he hopes to enroll students in the country’s first-ever master’s program in masculinity studies.

In the meantime, he’s trying to apply his insights into the male psyche to the question of how to stem college sexual assaults. While not a new problem, rape on campus has become a newly conspicuous one following a wave of antirape activism and heightened media attention to colleges’ sexual-assault policies. Even President Obama has weighed in, citing the oft-repeated (though widely contested) statistic that one in five female students is raped at some point in her college career. The Justice Department is now investigating several dozen schools for possibly mishandling rape complaints.

So far, says Kimmel, much of the national conversation has focused on reducing binge drinking and prosecuting perpetrators. A more overlooked problem, according to Kimmel, is that many college men are insecure, unprepared for sex, and desperate to prove themselves to their friends. He says many of them approach hookups with the mentality that “sex is a battle: I have to conquer you, I have to break down your resistance.”

The challenge, then, is to make men want sex that’s less like a battle and more like an unusually satisfying UN meeting, where everybody understands the proceedings and gets a vote. That’s admittedly a long way off: despite recent media scrutiny, fraternities are still caught displaying signs that say things like no means yes, yes means anal.

Kimmel says it’s not surprising that inebriation figures into so many sexual-assault cases. Many students arrive at college after having been “helicopter parented,” he argues, with their access to alcohol and sex strictly policed until the day they leave home. They’re then plunked into an environment full of unfamiliar rituals, bravado, enough booze to put the Russian army into a coma, and more sexually available people than they’ll ever encounter again.

For a detailed description of the Bro Code with research to back it up, check out the book “Guyland: The Perilous World Where Boys Become Men” by Michael Kimmel.

What do Boys Want?

Brett Sayer found that boys in both cultures are looking for intimacy and relationships, not only sex. But they differed in how much they believed they fit the norm. The Dutch boys thought that their desire to combine sex with relationships was normal, whereas American boys tended to see themselves as exceptionally romantic.

Research has shown American teenage boys – across racial and ethnic groups – crave intimacy and are as emotionally invested as girls are in romantic relationships.

Learning Masculinity

In the following photo series linked here, writer Pricilla Frank discusses a project undertaken by Jona Frank, who wanted to capture young men learning masculinty through boxing. Check out the series and reflect on how learning to be a “man” can be an uplifting as well as physically destructive experience.

Frank’s straightforward photographs, she says, “capture a space in between — between childhood and adulthood, attitude and authenticity, work and play. As the subjects get older, their expressions become more assured, while the younger ones seem to ask for approval in their puzzled expressions.”

“All the boys tried to act tough for the camera,” Jona Frank continued. “They remind me of the Arcade Fire song ‘Rococo’ — ‘They seem wild, but they are so tame.’”

Jona Frank’s series will be on view at the Smithsonian’s National Portrait Gallery in Washington, D.C., from March 12, 2016, through January 8, 2017. The photographs will also be compiled into a book of the same name, with an introduction by photographer Bruce Weber.

Football Town Nights – “Don’t Rape”

And here we have Amy Schumer’s sadly humorous take on the topic. While clearly all men are not rapists, her portrayal of “bro culture” is nothing short of brilliant, even if she does exaggerate for comedic effect. Bear in mind, the sketch is funny and resonates with an audience, because it’s likely many of us know or have encountered men that think like this.

Sources

Guyland, by Michael Kimmel (2008)

“Teaching Men to be Emotionally Honest,” by Andrew Reiner. Last accessed April 2016

“The Bro Whisperer,” by Olga Khazan. Last accessed April 2016

“Why Boys Need to Have Conversations About Emotional Intimacy in Classrooms,” by Brett Sayer

For more on Frank’s photo series, follow this link to an article published in The Independent. Last accessed April 2016

Discussion Questions

What does being a man mean to you?

Do you think that social roles for men in U.S. society are positive or negative? Do these roles ever feel restrictive or confining to you, such that you sometimes feel you don’t “fit” into them?

What do you think are the most crucial and healthy elements of masculinity?

Why is it necessary to “break” boys to make men?

Do feel it is necessary to supress your emotional life in order to be a man?

What do you think are the most toxic elements of masculinity and how do you think we might work to change that?

Do you think colleges and universities should invest time, money, and effort in promoting healthy masculinity?

How do you personally “own” your masculinity? Or do you not think about it at all?

Do you think there are some professions that cultivate an unhealthy model of masculinity? If so, which ones?

Do you think about choosing a college major and/or profession on the basis how it fulfills gender expectations?